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I. INTRODUCTION
A broad but useful definition of comparative law states that:
Comparative Law is not a body of rules and principles. Pri-
marily, it is a method, a way of looking at legal problems, le-
gal institutions, and entire legal systems. By the use of that
method it becomes possible to make observations, and to gain
insights, which would be denied to one who limits his study to
the law of a single country.'
More specifically, according to some scholars, comparative law
"was not solely the isolated study of foreign legal systems by spe-
cialized scholars, but was seen as a commitment to comparative
* Professor of Law, Bocconi University School of Law, Milan, Italy, and Pennsylvania
State University, Dickinson School of Law, University Park, PA, USA; Vice-director, Paolo
Baffi Research Center, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy; External Scientific Member, Max
Planck Institute Luxembourg; Research Member, European Corporate Governance Insti-
tute, Brussels, Belgium..
1. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAw 1 (5th ed. 1988).
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methodology throughout legal scholarship aimed to produce ac-
tionable knowledge for domestic reform."2
Based on these definitions, it is clear that comparative law can
play an important role in shaping the development of national or
state law. This is particularly true in the case of business law,
and specifically corporate law, a field in which international and
inter-states transactions are common and in which all the actors
involved (legislatures and regulators, the judiciary and legal
scholars) often have the opportunity, if not the need, to consider
foreign systems and to understand their rules. From this
knowledge a natural dialogue should follow among scholars, prac-
titioners and policy-makers of different jurisdictions regarding the
adoption (or rejection) of new rules or procedures unknown in one
particular country but developed in others. This dialogue is essen-
tial to solve the practical problem of coordinating different regula-
tions and legal approaches to specific issues. Legal history indi-
cates an almost endless list of "legal transplants" (defined below)
in this area.3
This Essay focuses on how comparative law played, and plays, a
role in the statutory development of corporate laws. To be sure,
comparative law also plays a role in the development of case law:
often judges look at other systems, treating their legislation or
case law as persuasive authority, especially when there is a lack of
precedents helpful to resolve the case before them in their own
jurisdiction. The role of comparative law in the development of
judge-made law is, however, subtler than and often not as clear as
in the case of statutory reforms. This is only natural, as judges
are primarily required to apply the law of the land, and only in
relatively rare situations do they explicitly turn to foreign exam-
ples, generally only as obiter dictum or as supporting argument to
sustain a conclusion based on local law. In addition, as courts de-
velop their own body of precedents, the influence of foreign deci-
2. Jedidiah Kroncke, Law and Development as Anti-Comparative Law, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 477, 510 (2012).
3. See Alan Watson, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAw 38 (1981); William Ewald, Com-
parative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489 (1995)
(considering Watson's theory of legal transplants). A very interesting look at the develop-
ment of corporate law from a comparative perspective, and insights on the diffusion of rules
elaborated in some jurisdictions to others is offered by Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolu-
tion of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791 (2002).
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sions tends to wane.4 Several Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court,
for example, are explicitly against the citation of foreign prece-
dents in their decisions.'
The influence of laws of other systems on the development of
statutory law is, on the contrary, more common and explicit. It
represents a tradition that accompanied legal reforms since the
very beginning of the development of legislation. For these rea-
sons I will concentrate on statutory law.
Concentrating our attention on modern corporate law,6 I argue
that it is necessary to distinguish two basic ways in which com-
parative law influences legal reforms in a particular jurisdiction.
The first one is through regulatory competition among different
systems. In order to make a system more competitive and attrac-
tive, or to remove disadvantages affecting the economic develop-
ment of a system, legislatures can respond to the threat of compe-
tition from foreign economies by changing their laws, either by
borrowing rules and institutions from other systems ("legal trans-
plants"), or by adopting rules designed to protect their own inter-
ests vis-A-vis the effects of foreign law.
The second "channel" through which comparative law plays a
role in shaping local rules is a top-down harmonization process.
Various factors can incentivize a harmonized regulation of corpo-
rations: the need to create a common market in which all economic
actors can operate in a leveled playing field, the removal of barri-
ers to commerce among states, the desire to reduce regulatory ar-
bitrage, the goal of ensuring to all constituencies of different juris-
4. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2008 (observing the decreasing influence of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the Supreme
Courts of Canada or Australia).
5. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 114 (2002). For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his
dissent in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S 304, 324-325 (2002), a capital punishment case ad-
dressing the execution of mentally retarded defendants, observed, "I fail to see, however,
how the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any
support for the Court's ultimate determination." Other justices have, on the other hand,
advocated the utility of considering foreign law as a guide, especially in certain hard cases:
for example Justice Breyer, but also Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Ginsburg. For a dis-
cussion of their positions, see Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 291 (2005). An interesting article on the use of comparative law in
judicial opinions in Europe is Martin Gelter & Mathias M. Siems, Citations to Foreign
Courts - Illegitimate and Superfluous, or Unavoidable? Evidence from Europe, available on
www.ssrn.com and forthcoming in 62 AM. J. COMP. L. - (2014); for a broader discussion of
this issue, see Mary Ann Glendon, Comparative Law in the Age of Globalization, 52 DuQ. L.
REV. 1 (2014) in this issue.
6. And the argument can obviously be extended to many other legal fields, from taxa-
tion to securities laws, from bankruptcy law to intellectual property, to name a few.
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dictions a similar level of legal protection, and so on. Typically,
international agreements can foster harmonization. The para-
digmatic examples of this are corporate law (and securities regula-
tion) directives in the European Union, but examples are also pre-
sent in the U.S. Consider, for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, which introduced some common rules into the field of corpo-
rate governance at the federal level, or the role played by the
Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA").' The rules contained
in these legal instruments are rarely developed out of the blue.
Generally, they take into account regulations already existing in
one or more jurisdictions, and through a negotiation process, tend
to extend them also to other systems.
In the following pages I will discuss several examples of how
comparative law influenced the development of statutory corpo-
rate law either through the mechanism of regulatory competition
or through harmonization, both in the U.S. and in the European
Union. I will conclude by considering the role of comparative law
in corporate law's statutory evolution. A final caveat is important:
in this Essay, I will include in the definition of comparative law
also comparisons among different legal systems belonging to the
same nation, such as in the case of U.S. states, and not limit the
notion of comparative analysis only to comparisons with foreign
legal systems.
II. REGULATORY COMPETITION IN THE U.S. AND THE ROLE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW: THE EMERGENCE OF DELAWARE
Regulatory competition among states has been defined as "the
genius" of American corporate law.' In the U.S., corporations are
free to choose the state of incorporation, and then simply file the
governing documents of the corporation with the local secretary of
that state.9 Once the choice is made, the internal affairs of the
7. For a critical overview of the corporate governance provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Houman B. Shadab, Innovation and Corporate
Governance: The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 955 (2008). For a
rich discussion of the evolution of the Model Business Corporation Act, see the contribu-
tions in James D. Cox & Herbert S. Wander (special editors), The Model Business Corpora-
tion Act at Sixty, 74 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (2011).
8. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
9. On the features of the U.S. "market" for corporate charters, see Marco Ventoruzzo,
"Cost-based" and "Rules-based" Regulatory Competition: Markets for Corporate Charters in




corporation are governed by the laws of the state of incorporation,
even if the corporation does not have any specific connection with
that state, apart from being incorporated there.'o States compete
to attract corporations both because of franchise taxes paid by the
corporation, and to maintain a vibrant market for legal services.
Scholars have discussed whether this competition among states
leads to a race to the top, i.e. the development of the most efficient
corporate law rules, or a race to the bottom, to the advantage of
states that offer a lower level of protection of shareholders. It is
well known that the "winner" of this competition is Delaware.
This feature of the American system has been discussed so exten-
sively in the literature that it is not necessary here to offer a full
account of how it works."
It is, however, interesting to consider the role played by compar-
isons among different states' corporate statutes in this race among
U.S. states. A phenomenon that is necessary to consider is the
expectation that states that want to compete with Delaware for a
slice of the "market for charters" would simply "copy" its statutory
provisions. Interestingly enough, however, this is not so com-
mon.1 One possible explanation is that the real advantage of Del-
aware is not so much in its statutory provisions (notoriously flexi-
ble, but also somehow vague and convoluted), but rather in the
expertise and efficiency of its judiciary, an element that is much
more difficult to replicate in other states, and in network external-
ities connected to the very fact that most publicly held corpora-
tions are incorporated in Delaware." Notwithstanding this obser-
10. See 1 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS 123
(2d ed. 2003).
11. Among many contributions on the role of state competition in corporate law and
securities regulation, as either a race-to-the-top or to-the-bottom, see the classical works by
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Re-
visited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L.
REV. 913 (1982); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Merrit B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999).
For a comprehensive bibliography on the role of regulatory competition in U.S. corporate
law, see Kagan Kocaoglu, A Comparative Bibliography: Regulatory Competition on Corpo-
rate Law (Georgetown Law Working Paper 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1103644.
12. Most states (thirty nine) have in fact preferred to adopt - with some local variations
- a version of the Model Business Corporation Act. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL.,
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 184 (2d ed. 2012).
13. See Peter V. Letsou, The Changing Face of Corporate Governance Regulation in the
United States: The Evolving Roles of the Federal and State Governments, 46 WILLAMETTE L.
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vation, comparisons among states have played a role in shaping
modem corporate law. I will briefly discuss here three examples,
in chronological order: the very initial stages of Delaware suprem-
acy, the adoption of anti-takeover statutes, and the enactment of
provisions aimed at increasing the power of shareholders in the
election of directors.
In the 1880s, New Jersey was looking for a way to improve its
finances. The state provided for a franchise tax for corporations
incorporated there. Following the advice of a New York attorney,
James B. Dill, the state decided to try to attract corporations by
making its laws more appealing to managers. In particular, to-
ward the end of the century, with a series of acts, New Jersey al-
lowed corporations to buy, hold and sell the stock of other corpora-
tions, making it possible to create holding corporations. Legal re-
forms in those years also simplified other relevant aspects of cor-
porate law, as other states began to feel the competitive pressure
exercised by New Jersey. 4 In 1892, for example, New York
granted a special charter to General Electric, containing provi-
sions very similar to the ones of the New Jersey legislation; this
charter was explicitly motivated by the fear that the corporation
might reincorporate in New Jersey."
In this context, Delaware was a follower of New Jersey. In 1899
it enacted a general corporation act that borrowed-in fact cop-
ied-many of the provisions of the New Jersey legislation that
were more attractive to managers, such as the possibility of per-
petual existence for a corporation, the fact that filing documents
with the secretary of state was sufficient to incorporate (without
judicial control), and rules allowing corporations to hold shares of
other in-state and out-of-state corporations." In the following
years, Delaware started eroding the advantage of New Jersey, in
part due to its lower taxes for business incorporated in the state,
and in part because of additional legislative measures designed to
REV. 149, 196 (2009). "Network externalities" are defined by economists as positive or
negative effects on the user of a product or service of others using the same or compatible
products. A good and simple example is the effect of owning a popular car: it is easier and
often cheaper to find spare parts and mechanics able to work on the car.
14. William E. Kirk, III, A Case Study in Legislative Opportunism: How Delaware Used
the Federal-State System to Attain Corporate Pre-Eminence, 10 J. CORP. L. 233, 246-50
(1984). See also Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
764, 820 (2012); Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of
1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249 (1976).
15. Kirk, supra note 14, at 249.
16. Id. at 255.
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favor corporate insiders. Particularly important in this respect
was the 1911 amendment of its general corporation law limiting
directors' liability for illegal payments of dividends or capital re-
ductions to cases of willful or negligent violation."
The true watershed came, however, with Woodrow Wilson, then
governor of New Jersey. As part of his presidential campaign in
1912, while he was still governor, Wilson took a strong position
against monopolies." As a consequence, state legislation against
monopolies and holding companies was enacted in New Jersey. 9
Almost immediately New Jersey started losing its competitive
edge in the market for corporate charters, and most corporations
turned to neighboring Delaware for a more business-friendly legal
environment. New Jersey saw a strong decline in the number of
businesses incorporating in the state, and Delaware became the
new leader. Although New Jersey repealed the anti-monopolistic
statutes adopted in 1912 just a few years later, it never regained
its original preeminence.20
The rise of Delaware as the most important state for corpora-
tions, especially publicly held ones, was largely the result of a
comparative study of the legislation of the sister state of New Jer-
sey. By borrowing the measures that were attractive to corpora-
tions, and rejecting the ones unfriendly to business, Delaware
built its competitive advantage and attained a position that lasts
to these days. 21 We can, therefore, observe that the very phenom-
enon of regulatory competition in U.S. corporate law developed
through legal transplants made possible by a comparative under-
standing of corporate statutes.
A. Anti-takeover Statutes
Another interesting and more recent example of how the corpo-
rate laws of one jurisdiction can influence, through regulatory
competition, the development of legal rules in other systems con-
cerns anti-takeover statutes. Beginning in the 1960s, due to a
wave of hostile acquisitions, states' legislatures started to attempt
17. Id.
18. Id. at 256.
19. Id. at 256-57.
20. Id. at 257-58.
21. Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 588, 609-10 (2003) (observ-
ing how Delaware "copied" New Jersey's corporate laws in order to attract corporations).
157Winter 2014
Duquesne Law Review
to protect corporations doing business or incorporated in the state
from possible hostile takeovers.
A "first generation" of anti-takeover statutes adopted a very
simple, and somehow naive, approach introducing specific disclo-
sure requirements, waiting periods to launch a tender offer, and
the need for a merit-based approval of the acquisition by a state
authority. 22 A good example of this first generation of statutes
was the Illinois Business Takeover Act. 23 The Supreme Court de-
clared this statute unconstitutional in Edgar v. Mite,24 both be-
cause it violated the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution,
and because it was pre-empted by the Williams Act,25 the federal
statute regulating takeovers, which aimed at creating a level play-
ing field between the acquirer and the target corporation.2 6
Other states, observing the outcome of this case, drafted anti-
takeover rules designed to avoid the constitutional hurdles raised
by the Illinois Act (so-called "second and third generation" stat-
utes).27 The key feature of these statutes was that they imple-
mented defensive barriers regulating the internal affairs of the
corporation, a subject strictly within the competence of states, and
that they only applied to domestic corporations (i.e., corporations
incorporated in the state).2 8 These statutes take several forms:
most of them are modeled after one of the following regulatory
schemes. There are "control share acquisition statutes" that pre-
vent a bidder acquiring more than a set threshold of the shares
from voting her shares unless a majority of disinterested share-
holders votes in favor of the acquisition. "Business combination
statutes" limit certain transactions that typically follow a success-
ful acquisition, such as mergers, sale of assets, and liquidation for
a number of years after the acquisition if the board of the target
22. Under a "merit-based" approach, a state authority is granted the power to review
the tender offer and allow it to go forward only if it determines that the price and condi-
tions offered are fair for the shareholders. The first anti-takeover statute was enacted in
Virginia in 1968; soon enough more than thirty states followed in its footsteps. See John C.
Anjier, Anti-Takeover Statutes, Shareholders, Stakeholders and Risk, 51 LA. L. REV. 561, 69
(1991).
23. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 121 1/2, [ 137.52-9 (1979), invalidated by Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624 (1982). See Guhan Subramanian, Steven Herscovici & Brian Barbetta, Is
Delaware's Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence from 1988-2008, 65 BUS. LAW.
685, 692 (2010).
24. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
25. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f)).
26. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 639.




corporation does not approve the transaction. "Fair price statutes"
require a bidder to offer a "minimum price" if the acquisition is not
approved by a supermajority of the shareholders. "Cash-out stat-
utes" provide that the acquirer of a set threshold of shares must
buy all the remaining shares at the highest price paid. 29  "Other
constituencies' statutes" allow the directors of the target to take
into account the interests of stakeholders different from share-
holders, like employees or the local community, in adopting defen-
sive measures. Finally, some statutes explicitly allow and regulate
the use of "poison pills" by the target corporation.30
One of the most significant examples of these second generation
statutes is the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act of 1986.1
Under this piece of legislation, the board of directors of an Indiana
corporation could opt into a regime in which, if a buyer passed a
specific threshold of the voting shares (twenty percent, thirty per-
cent, or fifty percent), she would not have the right to vote her
shares unless a majority of the remaining disinterested share-
holders granted her the right to vote. 32 In this case, the corpora-
tion might redeem the shares from the buyer at their fair value, if
authorized by the articles of incorporation or the bylaws.3 3
The constitutionality of this statute was challenged before the
Supreme Court in the famous case of Dynamics Corp. of America
v. CTS Corp." In this case Dynamics, a New York corporation,
intended to raise its stake in CTS, an Indiana corporation, from
approximately ten percent to almost twenty-three percent.35 Be-
cause CTS had opted into the Indiana Control Share Acquisition
Act, Dynamics sued, arguing the unconstitutionality of the stat-
ute. 36 The Court of Appeals ruled that the statute was invalid,
following Edgar." The Supreme Court, however, granted certio-
rari and ultimately decided that the statute was valid, both with
29. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 411 (2d ed. 2009).
30. See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence ofAntitakeover Statutes on Incorporation
Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1795, 1827 (2002).
31. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West 1986).
32. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 411.
33. See Russell D. Garrett, Third-Generation Anti-Takeover Statutes in Oregon and
Indiana after Dynamics: Target Corporations Control the Ship and Raiders are Foiled, 24
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 73, 83-84 (1988).
34. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
35. Id. at 75.
36. Id.
37. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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respect to the Commerce Clause and to the issue of preemption by
the Williams Act. 8
What is relevant to our discussion is how other states adopted
the Indiana approach after it passed constitutional scrutiny: Ore-
gon, for example, introduced its first anti-takeover statute on the
basis of the approach followed by the Indiana legislature.39
It is not necessary in this Essay to dissect the technicalities of
these laws, and it would be beside the point here to discuss the
economic effects of these provisions on the different stakeholders.4 0
It is interesting, however, to observe how quickly different states
copied legal instruments developed through experimentation in
other jurisdictions, yet another indication of how comparative
analysis led legislatures to use legal transplants to regulate the
market for corporate control.
B. Proxy Access and the (Failed) Challenge of North Dakota.
Continuing our analysis of examples of the influence of compar-
ative law through regulatory competition in the U.S., another in-
teresting case is offered by the recent debate on proxy access. In
short, in the last few years, institutional investors have been
pressing corporations to allow shareholders to include their nomi-
nees in the proxy statement sent out by the corporation for the
election of directors. Traditionally, in fact, corporations could ex-
clude shareholders' proposals concerning the election of directors
from the corporate proxies.41
In 2007, North Dakota tried to exploit investors' requests for a
stronger voice in the election of directors by enacting the North
38. Dynamics, 481 U.S. at 94. See Garrett, supra note 33, at 85.
39. Garrett, supra note 33, at 89.
40. It is worth noting, however, that the adoption of anti-takeover statutes tells us
something about the dynamics of regulatory competition in the U.S., and more specifically
about whether it leads to a race to the top or to the bottom. According to a very interesting
study by Subramanian, in fact, corporations seemed to stay away, or move, from states
with anti-takeover statutes too favorable for the target (such as Massachusetts, Ohio and
Pennsylvania). This empirical evidence suggests that the incumbents that make the deci-
sion on where to incorporate or reincorporate do not necessarily choose the jurisdiction that
offers them the highest level of protection, but look for systems that also protect adequately
the interests of minority shareholders to receive, under certain conditions, a premium for
control. See Subramanian, supra note 30, at 1801.
41. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Directors' Elections: A Revolu-
tion in the Making, 8(2) EUR. Co. & FIN. L. REV. 105 (2011).
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Dakota Publicly Traded Corporation Act ("NDPTCA").42 In brief,
the Act is a sort of investors' "wish list" that includes sharehold-
ers' access to corporate proxy statements, majority voting in direc-
tors' elections, shareholders' advisory votes on executive compen-
sation, and limitations to supermajority rules and antitakeover
provisions. The rationale was to enter the competition for corpo-
rate charters by offering a legal regime valued by institutional
investors, with the idea that some corporations might opt to incor-
porate in the state under pressure from these institutional inves-
tors. In this way, North Dakota hoped to compete against Dela-
ware in attracting corporations offering a new "product": its pro-
investors rules. As far as we can tell a few years after the enact-
ment of the North Dakota Act, the experiment has not really been
successful.43 It is, however, interesting for our purposes to point
out that, once again, an idea derived from comparative analysis of
corporate statutes formed the basis of statutory reform in the
field."
Even more interesting and relevant to our discussion is that,
shortly after the enactment of the NDPTCA, Delaware responded.
In particular, in 2009 the Delaware legislature amended Section
112 of the Delaware General Corporation Law to provide that the
bylaws of a corporation can grant shareholders access to the cor-
porate proxy statement in directors' elections under certain condi-
tions.4 5 Two caveats are important. First, the Delaware move did
not really add much to the pre-existing regime because, even be-
fore this amendment, the governing documents of the corporation
could allow proxy access to shareholders. Secondly, as also point-
ed out in general by Mark Roe," the Delaware legislature proba-
bly did not act out of fear of competition from North Dakota, but
rather to avoid federal rules on this issue that might preempt
state law (federal rules were in fact introduced later on).47
Once again, however, the point of this story is not so much
about the specific rules adopted, but rather to emphasize how reg-
ulatory competition (either horizontal, among states, or vertical,
42. N.D. Cent. Code § 10-35 (2010). For a critique of the possible success of the Act in
attracting corporations, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why the North Dakota Publicly Traded
Corporation Act Will Fail, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1043 (2008).
43. Ventoruzzo, supra note 41, at 112.
44. Id.
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (West 2013)
46. Roe, supra note 21, at 600.
47. Ventoruzzo, supra note 41, at 117.
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between state and federal law) creates the conditions through
which comparative analysis influences the development of statu-
tory corporate reforms.
III. HARMONIZATION OF CORPORATE STATUTES IN THE U.S. AND
THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Corporate statutes develop not only due to competitive pressure
among legislatures, but also as a result of harmonization efforts.
One of the best examples of successful harmonization that can be
found in the U.S. is the MBCA. This is a peculiar type of harmo-
nization in the sense that it is not imposed top-down, as in the
case of the European Union's directives, but rather, it is a spon-
taneous harmonization. The MBCA is not in fact a statute but, as
the name suggests, is instead a model adopted by the Committee
on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American
Bar Association in 1950 and frequently updated and revised
throughout the following decades.4 8 States are free to borrow all
or part of the provisions of the Act. As of 2005, approximately
twenty-four states had adopted-to a large extent, even if often
with some local variations-the MBCA.4 9 Other calculations sug-
gest a higher number of states following the MBCA." It might be
argued, as mentioned before, that more states have preferred to
turn to the MBCA rather than copying the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law, notwithstanding the role of Delaware in the market
for corporate charters.
A comparison of the structure of the MBCA with that of the
Delaware corporate statute illustrates why this is not surprising.
To the extent that it is possible to generalize, Delaware statutory
provisions leave a lot of room to case law, while the MBCA offers a
more detailed and comprehensive set of statutory provisions. It is
therefore easier for a state to copy the latter model, which gives
guidance to businesspeople, practitioners and judges. In addition,
48. For a recent collection of contributions discussing different aspects of the develop-
ment of the MBCA, see Cox & Wander, supra note 7. Interestingly enough, Canada also
shows a degree of harmonization with the MBCA. See also Cally Jordan, The Chameleon
Effect: Beyond the Bonding Hypothesis for Cross-Listed Securities, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 37, 71
n.126 (2006).
49. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 844 (2005).
50. Thirty nine, according to BRANSON ET AL., supra note 12.
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at least, according to its drafters, the MBCA was (and arguably is)
"better organized and more clearly drafted than the DGCL."1
The MBCA, however, was not born and did not develop out of
the blue. Quite the contrary, it can be considered something be-
tween a restatement of the best corporate laws and a compilation
of new rules designed to address specific problems emerging from
existing corporate laws. From this perspective, if one takes a clos-
er look, it is clear that between the MBCA and the DGCL itself
there is a "symbiotic" relationship, because one influenced the
other.5 2 In other words, the MBCA and its harmonizing strength
derive from comparative law.
For example, due to a historical accident, the first drafters of
the MBCA were predominantly members of the Chicago bar and,
therefore, the original structure of the MBCA resembled the Illi-
nois Business Corporation Act of 193353 quite closely.54 This Act,
however, had in turn been at least partially inspired by the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law, as were other modern corporate
statutes enacted during that period." The MBCA quickly became
very successful, and several states amended their corporation laws
to adopt provisions and approaches of the Act." Partially as a re-
sponse to this development, in the 1960s Delaware revised its cor-
poration statute, and the 1967 reform of Delaware law paid close
attention to the MBCA."
The development of the MBCA has also been influenced by
changes in the business environment. As an illustration, one can
consider that in 2006 the MBCA was amended to provide for ma-
jority voting to elect directors in response to growing pressure
from investors to adopt majority voting as opposed to plurality
voting."
The MBCA represents a form of spontaneous harmonization.
Convergence of corporate rules toward one single model can, how-
51. Jeffrey M. Gorris, Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware Corpo-
rate Law and the Model Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 108 (2011). See also Jule E. Stocker, Book Review, 16 BUS. LAW.
748, 748 (1961) (reviewing Model Business Corporation Act Annotated).
52. Gorris et al., supra note 51, at 107.
53. 1933 Ill. Laws 310.
54. Gorris et al., supra note 52, at 109.
55. Id.
56. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 7-8.
57. Gorris et al., supra note 52, at 109-11.
58. John F. Olson & Aaron K. Briggs, The Model Business Corporation Act and Corpo-
rate Governance: An Enabling Statute Moves toward Normative Standards, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 38 (2011).
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ever, also be achieved, somewhat more effectively, by the federal
government, to the extent that it can impose, directly or indirectly,
standards of corporate governance. This is what happened with
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002"5 ("SOX"), a statute adopted to
respond to corporate scandals with, among other measures, new
governance rules.o
Some of the most important reforms introduced in this area by
the SOX are: (a) the provision of an audit committee composed of
independent directors, (b) limits on the non-auditing services that
the audit firm can render to the corporation, (c) limitations on cor-
porate loans to executives, (d) executive certification of financial
statements, and (e) the creation of an accounting industry regula-
tor.6 ' The common denominator among these provisions was to
increase the independence of corporate actors in order to empower
them to react to accounting frauds. It is interesting to point out
that no U.S. state has mandated any of the governance rules in-
troduced with the SOX. 62
There is no strong evidence in the legislative history of the SOX
to suggest that Congress took into account foreign experiences in
crafting the new rules. It cannot be ignored, however, that several
foreign jurisdictions already provided for rules similar to those
enacted in the SOX. For example, most civil law countries have a
system of corporate governance in which the shareholders' meet-
ing appoints both a board of directors and a separate controlling
body composed of independent members (such as Italy's "collegio
sindacale"). This controlling body has functions at least partially
overlapping with the ones entrusted to the audit committee regu-
lated by the SOX.6" Again, in most European jurisdictions, even
before the SOX, auditing firms were subject to public oversight by
independent agencies (often the local equivalent of the Securities
and Exchange Commission). It seems natural to think that
59. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
60. See generally Romano, supra note 7; Shadab, supra note 7.
61. For an analytical discussion of these new rules, see Romano, supra note 7.
62. Id. at 1528.
63. In fact, the SEC rules list the Italian "collegio sinadacale" as a body that satisfies
the government requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Maria Camilla Cardilli, Reg-
ulation Without Borders: The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on European Companies, 27
FORDHAM INTL L.J. 785, 803 n.96 (2004).
64. David A. Skeel, Jr. et al., Inside-Out Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 147, 181
(2011); Lorenzo Segato, A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Protections in Italy and the
United States: Parmalat as a Case Study, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 373, 407 (2006); Luca
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these comparative insights played a role in shaping the new rules
introduced in 2002 in the U.S.
IV. REGULATORY COMPETITION IN EUROPE AND THE ROLE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW
Regulatory competition in the European Union does not play the
same role that it plays in the U.S. The difference is due to a num-
ber of factors that I have discussed in another article." To the
extent that a market for corporate charters exists in the European
Union, however, its features are very different from those of the
American market. More specifically, in the U.S., corporations that
shop around for more favorable corporate laws generally do so
when they decide to go public." Small, closely held corporations
tend to incorporate locally, where the actual seat of the corpora-
tion is located; only at a later stage, when they are about to be
listed, do they reincorporate (often in Delaware). In Europe, on
the contrary, the corporations that have their real seat in one
Member State and incorporate in another are generally small,
closely held corporations that often opt for a different jurisdiction
that offers more flexible rules on capital formation and on incorpo-
ration." Empirical evidence suggests, for example, that in the last
few years a significant number of firms located in continental Eu-
rope decided to incorporate in the U.K., due-among other rea-
sons-to less strict rules concerning the legal capital (the mini-
mum capital that the corporation needs to maintain in order to
operate) and a swifter incorporation process."
It is interesting to note how this particular kind of regulatory
competition prompted legal reforms in continental Europe. Sever-
al states in particular relaxed their rules on legal capital and
amended their corporate statutes to curb the attractiveness of the
U.K."
Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate
Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 923 (2003).
65. See generally Ventoruzzo, supra note 9.
66. Id. at 102.
67. Id.
68. Marco Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorporate? 24 (European Corporate Govern-
ance Inst., Working Paper No. 70/2006, 2007), available . at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=906066.
69. Evidence of regulatory competition responses to the U.K's ability to attract closely
held corporations have been found in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. See Becht,
supra note 68, at 29. As reported by Giuseppe B. Portale, La riforma delle societa di capi-
tali tra diritto comunitario e diritto internazionale privato, 1 EUROPA E DIR. PRIV. 101, n.70
Winter 2014 165
Duquesne Law Review
Once again, regulatory competition leads to the circulation of
legal rules and models among different countries: comparative
analysis is a key element of this competition and states quickly
adapt their corporate statutes due to competitive pressure from
other jurisdictions, often mimicking, at least partially, the more
attractive rules adopted abroad.
Regulatory competition in the field of corporate law does not on-
ly occur vis-h-vis the concrete fear of incorporation or reincorpora-
tion abroad. Virtually every major corporate law reform presents
an occasion to study the rules adopted in other jurisdictions and
imitate the ones that might contribute to the efficiency and com-
petitiveness of the business legal environment. The history of
corporate law (but also of other fields) clearly demonstrates this
comparative attitude of legislators. A good and relatively recent
example of this dynamic in Europe is offered by the reform of cor-
porate law enacted in Italy in 2003.
The reform was largely inspired by comparative corporate law.
In fact, it introduced into the Italian legal system several rules
borrowed from other jurisdictions. Just to mention two of the
most relevant cases, consider the rules on governance models and
on preemptive rights in the case of the issuance of new shares.
Traditionally, the Italian legal system was characterized by a cor-
porate governance model that provided that the shareholders'
meeting would appoint both a board of directors, entrusted with
the task of managing the corporation, and a board of statutory
auditors with controlling functions."o The reform of 2003 intro-
duced a richer menu. The bylaws can now opt for one of three al-
ternative models of corporate governance: the traditional one men-
tioned above, a two-tier model inspired by German law, and a one-
tier model inspired by British (and generally Anglo-Saxon) gov-
ernance models. In the case of the two-tier system, the sharehold-
ers' meeting appoints a supervisory board of directors, and this
body appoints a managing board. The former is entrusted with
(2005), in France, a statute, Article L. 223-2 of the Commercial Code (as modified by the
law of August 1, 2003), abolished minimum legal capital for limited liability corporations.
In Spain, law No. 7/2003 of April 1, 2003, allows the "Sociedad Limidada Nueva Empresa"
to be incorporated with a capital of little more than 3,000 euros. See RODRIGO URIA ET AL.,
CURSO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL, VOL. I 1131 (2006); see also Marco Ventoruzzo, Experi-
ments in Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform and the Dubious Virtues
of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective Regulatory Competition, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J.
113 (2004) (noting that amendments to Italian law in 2003 have added flexibility to the
rules governing the formation of capital and the financial structure of the corporation).
70. For a more detailed discussion, see Ventoruzzo, supra note 69, at 146.
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controlling functions; the latter manages the corporation. In the
case of the one-tier model, the shareholders only appoint a board
of directors, which must include a certain number of independent
directors. The board appoints, among its members, an auditing
committee that closely resembles the one that can be found in
common law systems.'
As mentioned above, rules concerning the financial structure of
the corporation have also been overhauled in light of foreign expe-
riences. For example, before 2003, a corporation that wanted to
issue new shares had to offer them to existing shareholders with a
preemptive right to purchase the new shares.7 2 There were only
three exceptions to this mandatory preemptive right: when the
corporation issued shares for consideration in kind, when the "in-
terests" of the corporation required the exclusion of the right (for
example, in the case of an IPO, when it is necessary to distribute
the shares among many investors in order to be listed on a stock
exchange), and in the case of shares issued to employees. Manda-
tory preemptive rights protect existing shareholders against the
risk of dilution, but they might also adversely affect the ability of
the corporation to raise funds quickly when market conditions are
favorable, if nothing else because the corporation needs to offer
the shares to the existing shareholders before other possible inves-
tors. The reform of 2003 liberalized this procedure to some extent
for listed corporations. It introduced a new basis for limiting
preemptive rights: now the bylaws of a listed corporation can ex-
clude the shareholders' preemptive rights for up to ten percent of
the existing legal capital, provided that the issuing price equals
the market value of the shares and that this prerequisite is veri-
fied by a report issued by the auditing firm.7 ' This new rule was
almost entirely copied from the German corporation law, clearly in
an effort to make the financing of Italian listed corporations more
flexible and competitive.74
71. Id.
72. Id. at 125.
73. Id.
74. See Gaia Balp & Marco Ventoruzzo, Esclusione del Diritto d'Opzione nelle Societa
con Azioni Quotate nei Limiti del Dieci per Cento del Capitale e Determinazione del Prezzo
di Emissione, 49 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA 795 (2004) (It.).
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V. HARMONIZATION IN EUROPE AND THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE
LAW
Traditionally, European corporate law systems have differed
among themselves more than the corporate laws of the individual
states in the United States. Notwithstanding the existing differ-
ences among U.S. states with respect to their corporate laws, their
common legal origins and shared language contribute to create a
rather harmonized patchwork of legal rules in this field. On the
contrary, the different legal origins and legal systems of Europe
have produced corporate statutes with more profound differences.
As part of the effort to create a common market, and in order to
reduce regulatory arbitrage, the European Union has engaged in a
significant effort to harmonize corporate law and securities regu-
lation in Europe." Several directives have contributed to create a
common regulatory framework in this area in Europe, notwith-
standing that some scholars have dismissed the importance of Eu-
ropean law in harmonizing the legal systems of the Member
States."
Obviously, European directives are not created out of the blue.
They often embrace regulatory solutions adopted in some States,
or at least take into account the differences among single jurisdic-
tions in order to create a level playing field. From this perspec-
tive, E.U. directives can be influenced by comparative law consid-
erations, and through the harmonizing efforts of the Union, com-
parative law plays an important role in shaping the corporate
laws of the different Member States. In other words, sometimes
European law is a "Trojan horse" through which rules and models
developed in one system gain entry into others." Of course, as
with any legal transplant, this technique has both upsides and
downsides.
An excellent example of this dynamic is offered by the Thir-
teenth Directive on Takeovers ("the Directive"), which finally saw
75. Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law--A Comparison of the United States
and European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-
2, 51 (2002).
76. Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are
They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1 (2006).
77. The image of directives as "Trojan horses" for some rules is used, with respect to
the Thirteenth Directive, by Heribert Hirte, The Takeover Directive: A Mini-Directive on the




the light in 2004 after almost twenty years of discussion." The
Directive is in many ways a compromise among the different
views of Member States with diverging opinions concerning the
role of the market for corporate control. Its two most important
pillars are the mandatory tender offer and the board neutrality
rule. 9 The mandatory tender offer rule provides that anyone who
acquires control of a listed corporation (defined, in most states, as
a set threshold of voting shares, generally around thirty percent),
is obliged to launch a bid on all the outstanding voting shares at
the highest price paid for the shares by the bidder over a period of
six to twelve months preceding the acquisition of the requisite
threshold." The board neutrality rule, on the other hand, pro-
vides that the directors of the target corporation cannot adopt any
defensive measure to fend off the takeover without the authoriza-
tion of the shareholders' meeting." This rule is actually optional
in the sense that the bylaws of listed corporations can opt out of it
and grant more freedom to incumbent directors in protecting the
corporation from hostile acquisitions.
For the purposes of this Essay, it is important to consider that
the basic framework of the Directive is modeled after the British
takeover regulation. The British approach has become the law all
over Europe, once again demonstrating the role of comparative
law in the harmonization process.8 2 There is, however, an im-
portant and interesting twist. In the U.K., due to the existence of
widespread ownership structures, most corporations are controlled
with a percentage of shares significantly lower than the threshold
78. Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on takeover
bids. On this piece of legislation, see Jesper Lau Hansen, When Less Would Be More: The
EU Takeover Directive in its Latest Apparition, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 275 (2003); John
Elofson, Lie Back and Think of Europe: American Reflections on the EU Takeover Directive,
22 Wis. INT'L L.J. 523 (2004); Dmitry Tuchinsky, The Takover Directive and Inspire Art:
Reevaluating the European Union's Market in the New Millenium, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
689 (2006-2007); Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe's Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regu-
lation: Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 171, 203
(2006). On the limited success of the directive in harmonizing the regulation of takeovers
in Europe, especially with respect to defensive measures, see Andrew Zwecker, The EU
Takeover Directive: Eight Years Later, Implementation But Still No Harmonization Among
Member States on Acceptable Takeover Defenses, 21 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233 (2012).
79. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 78, at 191-203, 205-09.
80. Id. at 206-07.
81. Id. at 208.
82. For a discussion of how the British regulatory paradigm on takeovers has been
incorporated into the Thirteenth Directive and therefore, to some degree, transplanted in
continental Europe (and the consequences of this transplant), see Marco Ventoruzzo, Take-
over Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Taking U.K. Rules to Continental Europe, 11
U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 135 (2008).
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that triggers the mandatory bid.83 In the U.K., in other words, it
is still possible that both friendly and hostile acquisitions occur
without any need to launch a tender offer on all the outstanding
shares. The rationale of the mandatory tender offer in its country
of origin is to grant to shareholders an exit at a fair price when
someone acquires a share so large that it makes future (hostile)
acquisitions unlikely.
This rule, however, has also been transplanted through the Di-
rective into continental European systems, where ownership
structures are more concentrated and the controlling shareholder
generally owns more than the triggering threshold of the manda-
tory tender offer." One of the possible unintended consequences
of the mandatory tender offer, therefore, is to operate as a sort of
statutory defensive measure in favor of existing controlling share-
holders. In fact, whoever intends to acquire control must be ready
to buy all of the outstanding shares - a significant financial bur-
den. Interestingly enough, the European mandatory offer rule
resembles quite closely some of the anti-takeover statutes or
measures adopted in the U.S. and mentioned above."
A similar observation can be made with respect to the board
neutrality rule. In the U.K., first of all, directors generally have
greater freedom than their continental European counterparts to
adopt defensive measures." On the other hand, in continental
Europe, general corporate laws give the shareholders control over
several of the most typical defenses, such as issuing new shares or
approving a merger." In this respect, therefore, one might argue
that in continental European systems the board neutrality rule
did not change the normal division of competencies between the
board and the shareholders' meeting in a very significant way.
But there is more: due to the presence of a strong controlling
shareholder, in these countries the fact that the shareholders'
83. Id. at 139-43.
84. Id.
85. See supra Part II.A.
86. Even if, as persuasively argued by David Kershaw, The Illusion of Importance:
Reconsidering the UK's Takeover Defence Prohibition, 56 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 267 (2007), in
the U.K most defensive measures would require shareholders' approval also in the absence
of the board neutrality rule, due to the application of general corporate law rules.
87. On the competences of shareholders vis-A-vis directors in some continental Europe-
an systems, see Ventoruzzo, supra note 69, at 130; Ignacio Lojendio Osborne, La Junta
general de accionistas, in DERECHO MERCANTIL 344 (Guillermo J. Jim6nez SAnchez ed.,
2006); MAURICE COZIAN, ALAIN VIANDIER & FLORENCE DEBOISSY, DROIT DES SOCitiis 223




meeting must approve defensive measures does not take the pow-
er to decide whether to resist the takeover away from whoever
actually controls the corporation. In fact, it basically gives a say
on the adoption of defensive measures to the very subject in con-
flict with minority shareholders. This result is quite contrary to
the experience in the U.K., where the rule was adopted. In this
system, due to the prevailing widespread ownership structures
and the presence of institutional investors as minority sharehold-
ers, letting the shareholders' meeting decide really means taking
into account the opinion of minority investors, because the control-
ling shareholder often does not have enough votes to oppose a val-
ue-maximizing offer in order to retain the private benefits of con-
trol. Finally, as mentioned above, one of the compromises of the
Directive is that the board neutrality rule is optional and corpora-
tions can opt out of it. For these reasons, several commentators
have questioned whether the directive really empowers minority
shareholders in continental European countries as it does in the
U.K."
This example shows how the use of comparative law affects the
harmonization process of European corporate statutes, but it also
shows the possible shortcomings of legal transplants: the effects of
a rule developed in a system with certain features can be very dif-
ferent, and have unintended consequences, when the rule is ex-
ported to systems with different characteristics.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Essay we have observed how the evolution of statutory
corporate law can be determined by two forces: regulatory compe-
tition, generally a spontaneous effort by single legislatures to ren-
der their systems more attractive than others; and harmonization,
sometimes imposed in a top-down manner. Actually, the distinc-
tion between these two "channels" is much more nuanced, and
they often intertwine. Regulatory competition can push toward
greater harmonization as some states copy the rules developed in
other systems, and harmonization can affect the possibility of reg-
ulatory arbitrage and, therefore, the level of competition among
different jurisdictions to attract corporations. What is interesting,
however, is to recognize the powerful role that comparative law,
with its tendency to circulate legal models, plays in the case of
88. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 82, at 172.
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both regulatory competition and harmonization in the U.S. and in
Europe.
Often legal reforms are at least partially modeled on foreign ex-
periences. This is sometimes beneficial, as more efficient solutions
experimented in one jurisdiction become available in other sys-
tems. However, the circulation of models also presents the risk
implicit in any legal transplant: similar rules, adopted in different
economic contexts, can have very different-sometimes even oppo-
site-effects than the ones they had in their country of origin.
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion is
how comparative law in statutory reforms often-and not surpris-
ingly-tends to look more attentively at systems and models that
are more similar to the local one. As the reader has noticed, in the
U.S. most of the comparative considerations looked at other U.S.
states, and the same can be said about European legal reforms.
For this reason, it is fair as a final conclusion to observe that "re-
gional comparisons" (i.e., comparisons with systems that are closer
geographically, culturally or economically) tend to be the predom-
inant source of legal transplants in corporate law reforms."
In any case, awareness of comparative law is a key element for
any statutory innovation. The cases discussed in this Essay
demonstrate the role that comparative considerations have always
played, and will always play, in the evolution of corporate law, and
in particular in case of statutory reforms, both as an instrument of
regulatory competition and to support harmonization efforts.
89. Obviously, there are some notable exceptions. It is well known among comparative
corporate law scholars, for example, that "[t]he Model Business Corporation Act and the
modem Japanese Commercial Code were both created in 1950 and based on the Illinois
Business Corporation Act of 1933," as explained in an article by Mark D. West, The Puz-
zling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations from Japan and the United
States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 527 (2001), even if, as pointed out by Professor West, the
systems tended to diverge over the course of the last few decades.
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